Mechanism Design for Fair Division

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Abstract

We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective, using proportional fairness as a benchmark. In particular, we aim to allocate a collection of divisible items to a set of agents while incentivizing the agents to be truthful in reporting their valuations. For the very large class of homogeneous valuations, we design a truthful mechanism that provides every agent with at least a $\frac{1}{e} \approx 0.368$ fraction of her proportionally fair valuation. To complement this result, we show that no truthful mechanism can guarantee more than a 0.5 fraction, even for the restricted class of additive linear valuations. We also propose another mechanism for additive linear valuations that works really well when every item is highly demanded. To guarantee truthfulness, our mechanisms discard a carefully chosen fraction of the allocated resources; we conclude by uncovering interesting connections between our mechanisms and celebrated solutions from the mechanism design literature that use money instead.

1 Introduction

This paper studies the problem of allocating a collection of scarce resources among a set of self-interested agents. We approach this problem from the perspective of a central policy maker who designs the mechanisms dictating the resource allocation outcome. For instance, the policy maker could be the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which is responsible for designing the schedules regulating access to the U.S. airspace and airports, or the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which designs the auctions of electromagnetic spectrum licenses in the U.S. The agents in these examples, i.e., the airlines competing for landing slots, or the telecommunications companies competing for spectrum, may have diverse preferences regarding the outcome, so the policy maker strives to design mechanisms that optimize some trade-off between efficiency and fairness [1].

In many instantiations of this general framework, including the examples mentioned above, the policy maker faces a crucial obstacle: the agents’ preferences may not be known in advance, and without this information no mechanism can ensure that the resources are allocated effectively. One solution would be to ask the agents to report their preferences to the mechanism but, unless the mechanism is designed very carefully, the agents may be better off misreporting. The main goal of this paper is to study the extent to which the policy maker can guarantee the fairness of the resulting allocation using mechanisms that incentivize the agents to report their true preferences.

The need to address the tension between the goals of the agents, who aim to optimize their own allocation, and the objective of the policy maker, has been the foundation of mechanism design. In

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this literature, a mechanism comprises an allocation rule and a payment rule; the former decides how the resources are allocated, and the latter defines the monetary payment that each agent needs to contribute in exchange for the resources she is allocated. A mechanism is truthful if its allocation and payment rule guarantee that reporting the truth is always to the agent’s best interest.

A classic result in mechanism design is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction, a truthful mechanism that maximizes efficiency. In particular, if the valuation of each agent \( i \) for a resource allocation outcome \( x \) is represented using some function \( v_i(x) \), then the VCG mechanism outputs an allocation that maximizes the aggregate value, i.e., \( \sum_{i} v_i(x) \). An impressive property of VCG is that it combines truthfulness and efficiency for a very large family of instances. On the negative side, the efficiency objective that VCG optimizes, known as utilitarian social welfare, can be extremely unfair to individual agents, which makes it inappropriate for many applications.

Even when fairness is not the primary concern, e.g., in the FAA air traffic scheduling example, unfair mechanisms might not be implementable in practice [2]. Hence, in designing practical mechanisms, the policy maker often has to satisfy equitability constraints. Avoiding inequitable allocations is even more critical when fairness is among the primary objectives; the following settings are just a few illustrations of very different sizes where this is true:

- **Divorce settlement negotiations.** When a married couple decides to get a divorce, the marital property needs to be divided between them, and the laws governing this process aim to reach an outcome that is fair to both of the individuals.

- **Allocating resources within a company.** Companies need to distribute their resources among different groups of employees in an equitable fashion. For example, engineers within Google need to share access to the servers (processing time and memory) and the network.

- **Privatization auctions.** Several mass privatization auctions took place in formerly socialist countries (e.g., Czechoslovakia) in the early 90s. These governments sought to privatize, in a fair manner, the state owned firms dating from the then recently ended communist era [3].

Despite the importance of equitability considerations, the progress on fair mechanisms that guarantee truthfulness has been very limited. In particular, there is no known fair counterpart of the VCG mechanism combining truthfulness and fairness for a large class of instances. This lack of progress is in contrast to the very rich literature on fair division, which has proposed various notions of fairness [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. One notion of fairness that has received a lot of attention is the maximin criterion, also known as egalitarian social welfare, which was suggested by John Rawls [9]. Unlike VCG, which maximizes the aggregate value, a mechanism using the maximin objective outputs an allocation \( x \) that maximizes the minimum value over all agents, i.e., \( \min_{i} \{ v_i(x) \} \).

**Example 1.1** (Utilitarian versus egalitarian). Two airline companies are competing for landing slots: Airline 1 has a value \( v_1 \) for each slot, and Airline 2 has a slightly higher value \( v_2 > v_1 \) because it owns planes that carry more passengers. According to the utilitarian objective, all the available landing slots are allocated to Airline 2 since its value is higher. On the other hand, according to the egalitarian objective, both of the airlines receive some slots, but Airline 1 receives more! In particular, for every \( v_1 \) slots that Airline 2 receives, the egalitarian solution allocates \( v_2 \) slots to Airline 1 so that the total value of the two airlines is equalized.

This toy example exhibits the fact that both the utilitarian and the egalitarian objective lead to extreme outcomes: the former sacrifices fairness in favor of efficiency, and the latter sacrifices efficiency in favor of satisfying the least happy agent. This effect can become even more pronounced
as the number of resources and agents increases, which calls for a more reasonable trade-off between fairness and efficiency.

A well studied solution that strikes a very appealing compromise between these two extreme objectives is the Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (CEEI), which is widely regarded as the ideal solution for fairness in microeconomics [10, 11, 12, 13]. The preferred allocation according to this solution corresponds to the competitive equilibrium outcome of the market that would arise if each agent were to be allotted the same amount of an artificial currency, which she could use to “buy” resources. In this outcome, CEEI prices are computed for the resources, and every agent spends her budget optimally, i.e., on the resources that yield the best value for (scrip) money. The following simple example provides some intuition regarding what this outcome looks like.

**Example 1.2 (CEEI).** Three farmers produced 54 sacks of corn and 54 sacks of wheat, and they need to share it. The first producer values each sack of corn 3 times more than a sack of wheat, the second values wheat 3 times more than corn, and the last one values wheat 1.5 times more than corn. If each of the producers were to be allocated a single unit of scrip money, then the CEEI price for buying all the corn in this instance would be $6/5$, and the price of wheat would be $9/5$. At these prices, the first producer would prefer to spend all of her 1 unit of scrip money on corn, which would buy her a $5/6$ fraction of it (45 sacks), and the second producer would spend all of her budget on wheat, which would buy her a $5/9$ fraction of it (30 sacks). Finally, for the third producer, both of the crops have the same value for money, so she would spend $1/5$ of her budget on corn and $4/5$ on wheat, which would buy her all the remaining sacks, thus clearing the market.

The CEEI solution is fair in a very straightforward way: it is the outcome that would arise if every agent had exactly the same buying power. The fact that each agent spends her budget on the items she prefers implies that this allocation is *envy free*; that is, no agent would prefer to swap the resources that she is allocated with those of someone else. Envy-freeness is a highly desired and very natural criterion that a fair allocation should meet. In addition to its fairness properties, the CEEI is also Pareto efficient.

Another remarkable property of the CEEI is that, for a very large family of instances, it is equivalent to the Nash bargaining solution [14, 15], which is the result of an axiomatic characterization of the properties that a fair solution should satisfy [16]. This implies that the CEEI is *scale-free*, which means that, the scale in which an agent reports her values for the resources does not affect the outcome. In other words, if a producer in the CEEI example above has a value of $v_c = 1$ for a sack of corn and $v_w = 2$ for a sack of wheat, reporting $v_c = 2$ and $v_w = 4$ instead would not affect the outcome. To verify this fact, note that the Nash bargaining solution chooses the allocation $x$ that maximizes the product of the agents’ values, i.e., $\prod_i v_i(x)$.

Furthermore, the outcome prescribed by these solutions is the de facto bandwidth sharing method used in the networking community. This solution which, in the TCP congestion control context is known as *proportional fairness* (PF), was introduced in the seminal work of Kelly [17], and it is currently the *most widely* implemented solution in practice (for instance see [18])\(^1\). In this paper we study instances where these three solutions coincide, so, for notational simplicity, we henceforth refer to the CEEI outcome as PF.

The main drawback of the PF allocation is that it cannot be implemented using truthful mechanisms; even for simple instances involving just two agents and two items, it is not difficult to show

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\(^1\)We note that some of the earlier work on proportional fairness such as [17] and [19] have 2000+ and 3900+ citations respectively in google scholar, indicating the importance and usage of this solution.
that no payments rule can be combined with the PF allocation rule to make it truthful. In fact, the scale independence of the PF allocation renders the use of actual monetary payments useless: it is easy to verify that, when the allocation rule of a truthful mechanism is scale-free then its payment rule needs to be scale-free as well. But a payment rule that does not depend on the scale of the agents’ values cannot guarantee individual rationality, i.e., that no agent ever pays more than the value of the resources that she was allocated. Therefore, using monetary payments to ensure the truthfulness of the participants is not an option.

In the absence of monetary payments, the only tool for aligning the incentives of the agents with the objectives of the policy maker is what Hartline and Roughgarden referred to as “money burning” [20]. That is, the policy maker can choose to intentionally keep some of the resources unallocated in order to appropriately influence the incentives of the agents. This withholding of resources can often be interpreted as an implicit form of “payment”, but since these payments do not correspond to actual trades, they are essentially burned.

1.1 Our results

In this work we introduce a method for applying money burning in order to design truthful mechanisms that closely approximate the PF allocation. We focus on instances involving multiple divisible resources (or items) and we provide some surprising positive results for the induced problem in multi-dimensional mechanism design without payments. To measure the fairness of our mechanisms we use the PF solution as a benchmark, and our goal is to guarantee that every agent receives a good approximation of the value that she should be receiving according to the PF allocation. Using this measure, we follow a worst-case analysis approach, according to which the quality of the mechanism is measured in the worst possible instances that may arise, and our goal is to minimize the inequitability in these cases.

The main contribution of this paper is the Partial Allocation mechanism. In Section 3 we analyze this mechanism and we prove that it is truthful and it guarantees that every player will receive at least a $1/e$ fraction of her PF valuation. These results hold for the general class of instances where players have arbitrary homogeneous valuation functions. This includes a wide range of well studied valuation functions, from additive linear and Leontief, to Constant Elasticity of Substitution and Cobb-Douglas [21]. We later extend these results to homogeneous valuations of any degree. To complement this positive result, we provide a negative result showing that no truthful mechanism can guarantee to every player an allocation with value greater than 0.5 of the value of the PF allocation, even if the mechanism is restricted to the class of additive linear valuations.

In proving the truthfulness of the Partial Allocation mechanism we reveal a connection between the amount of resources that the mechanism discards and the payments in VCG mechanisms. In a nutshell, multiplicative reductions in allocations are analogous to payments. As a result, we anticipate that this approach may have a significant impact on other problems in mechanism design without money. Indeed, we have already applied this approach to the problem of maximizing social welfare without payments for which a special two-agent version of the Partial Allocation mechanism allowed us to improve upon a setting for which mostly negative results were known [22].

In Section 4 we show that, restricting the set of possible instances to ones involving players with additive linear valuations\(^2\) and items with high prices in the competitive equilibrium from

\(^2\)Note that our negative results imply that the restriction to additive linear valuations alone would not be enough to allow for significantly better approximation factors.
equal incomes\textsuperscript{3}, will actually allow for the design of even more efficient and useful mechanisms. We present the \textit{Strong Demand Matching} (SDM) mechanism, a truthful mechanism that performs increasingly well as the competitive equilibrium prices increase. More specifically, if \( p^*_j \) is the price of item \( j \), then the approximation factor guaranteed by this mechanism is equal to \( \min_j (p^*_j/\lceil p^*_j \rceil) \). It is interesting to note that scenarios such as the privatization auction mentioned above involve a number of bidders much larger than the number of items; as a rule, we expect this to lead to high prices and a very good approximation of the participants’ PF valuations.

1.2 Related Work

Our setting is closely related to the large topic of fair division or cake-cutting \([4, 5, 6, 7, 8]\), which has been studied since the 1940’s, using the \([0, 1]\) interval as the standard representation of a cake. Each agent’s preferences take the form of a valuation function over this interval, and then the valuations of unions of subintervals are additive. Note that the class of homogeneous valuation functions of degree one takes us beyond this standard cake-cutting model. Leontief valuations for example, allow for complementarities in the valuations, and then the valuations of unions of subintervals need not be additive. On the other hand, the additive linear valuations setting that we focus on in Section 4 is very closely related to cake-cutting with piecewise constant valuation functions over the \([0, 1]\) interval. Other common notions of fairness that have been studied in this literature are, proportionality\textsuperscript{4}, envy-freeness, and equitability \([4, 5, 6, 7, 8]\).

Despite the extensive work on fair resource allocation, truthfulness considerations have not played a major role in this literature. Most results related to truthfulness were weakened by the assumption that each agent would be truthful in reporting her valuations unless this strategy was dominated. Very recent work \([23, 24, 25, 26]\) studies truthful cake cutting variations using the standard notion of truthfulness according to which an agent need not be truthful unless doing so is a dominant strategy. Chen et al. \([23]\) study truthful cake-cutting with agents having piecewise uniform valuations and they provide a polynomial-time mechanism that is truthful, proportional, and envy-free. They also design randomized mechanisms for more general families of valuation functions, while Mossel and Tamuz \([24]\) prove the existence of truthful (in expectation) mechanisms satisfying proportionality in expectation for general valuations. Zivan et al. \([25]\) aim to achieve envy-free Pareto optimal allocations of multiple divisible goods while reducing, but not eliminating, the agents’ incentives to lie. The extent to which untruthfulness is reduced by their proposed mechanism is only evaluated empirically and depends critically on their assumption that the resource limitations are soft constraints. Very recent work by Maya and Nisan \([26]\) provides evidence that truthfulness comes at a significant cost in terms of efficiency.

The recent papers of Guo and Conitzer \([27]\) and of Han et al. \([28]\) also consider the truthful allocation of multiple divisible goods; they focus on additive linear valuations and their goal is to maximize the social welfare (or efficiency) after scaling every player’s reported valuations so that her total valuation for all items is 1. Guo and Conitzer \([27]\) study two-agent instances, providing both upper and lower bounds for the achievable approximation; Han et al. \([28]\) extend these results and also study the multiple agents setting. For problem instances that may involve an arbitrary number of items both papers provide negative results: no non-trivial approximation factor can

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\textsuperscript{3}The prices induced by the market equilibrium when all bidders have a unit of scrip money; also referred to as PF prices.

\textsuperscript{4}It is worth distinguishing the notion of PF from that of proportionality by noting that the latter is a much weaker notion, directly implied by the former.
be achieved by any truthful mechanism when the number of players is also unbounded. For the two-player case, after Guo and Conitzer [27] studied some classes of dictatorial mechanisms, Han et al. [28] showed that no dictatorial mechanism can guarantee more than the trivial 0.5 factor. Interestingly, we recently showed [22] that combining a special two-player version of the Partial Allocation mechanism with a dictatorial mechanism can actually beat this bound, achieving a 2/3 approximation.

The resource allocation literature has seen a resurgence of work studying fair and efficient allocation for Leontief valuations [29, 30, 31, 32]. These valuations exhibit perfect complements and they are considered to be natural valuation abstractions for computing settings where jobs need resources in fixed ratios. Ghodsi et al. [29] defined the notion of Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF), which is a generalization of the egalitarian social welfare to multiple types of resources. This solution has the advantage that it can be implemented truthfully for this specific class of valuations; as the authors acknowledge, the CEEI solution would be the preferred fair division mechanism in that setting as well, and its main drawback is the fact that it cannot be implemented truthfully. Parkes et al. [31] assessed DRF in terms of the resulting efficiency, showing that it performs poorly. Dolev et al. [30] proposed an alternate fairness criterion called Bottleneck Based Fairness, which Gutman and Nisan [32] subsequently showed is satisfied by the proportionally fair allocation. Gutman and Nisan [32] also posed the study of incentives related to this latter notion as an interesting open problem. Our results could potentially have significant impact on this line of work as we are providing a truthful way to approximate a solution which is recognized as a good benchmark. It would also be interesting to study the extent to which the Partial Allocation mechanism can outperform the existing ones in terms of efficiency.

Most of the papers mentioned above contribute to our understanding of the trade-offs between either truthfulness and fairness, or truthfulness and social welfare. Another direction that has been actively pursued is to understand and quantify the trade-off between fairness and social welfare. Bertsimas et al. [2, 1], and Caragiannis et al. [33] measured the deterioration of the social welfare caused by different fairness restrictions, the price of fairness. More recently, Cohler et al. [34] designed algorithms for computing allocations that (approximately) maximize social welfare while satisfying envy-freeness. Also, the work of Cohen et al. [35], and of Feldman and Lai [36] considers the question of finding mechanisms that satisfy both truthfulness and envy-freeness without sacrificing any social welfare.

Our results fit into the general agenda of approximate mechanism design without money, explicitly initiated by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [37]. The underlying connection of our main mechanism with VCG proposes a framework for designing truthful mechanisms without money and we anticipate that this might have a significant impact on this literature.

2 Preliminaries

Let $M$ denote the set of $m$ items and $N$ the set of $n$ bidders. Each item is divisible, meaning that it can be divided into arbitrarily small pieces, which are then allocated to different bidders. An allocation $x$ of these items to the bidders defines the fraction $x_{ij}$ of each item $j$ that each bidder $i$ will be receiving; let $\mathcal{F} = \{x \mid x_{ij} \geq 0 \text{ and } \sum_i x_{ij} \leq 1\}$ denote the set of feasible allocations. Each bidder is assigned a weight $b_i \geq 1$ which allows for interpersonal comparison of valuations, and can serve as priority in computing applications, as clout in bargaining applications, or as a budget for the market equilibrium interpretation of our results. We assume that $b_i$ is defined by the mechanism
as it cannot be truthfully elicited from the bidders. The preferences of each bidder \( i \in N \) take the form of a valuation function \( v_i(\cdot) \), that assigns nonnegative values to every allocation in \( F \). We assume that every player’s valuation for a given allocation \( x \) only depends on the bundle of items that she will be receiving.

We will present our results assuming that the valuation functions are homogeneous of degree one, i.e. player \( i \)’s valuation for an allocation \( x' = f \cdot x \) satisfies \( v_i(x') = f \cdot v_i(x) \), for any scalar \( f > 0 \). We later discuss how to extend these results to general homogeneous valuations of degree \( d \) for which \( v_i(x') = f^d \cdot v_i(x) \).

An allocation \( x^* \in F \) is Proportionally Fair (PF) if, for any other allocation \( x' \in F \) the (weighted) aggregate proportional change to the valuations after replacing \( x^* \) with \( x' \) is not positive, i.e.: 
\[
\sum_{i \in N} \frac{b_i[v_i(x') - v_i(x^*)]}{v_i(x^*)} \leq 0.
\] 
This allocation rule is a strong refinement of Pareto efficiency, since Pareto efficiency only guarantees that if some player’s proportional change is strictly positive, then there must be some player whose proportional change is negative. The Proportionally Fair solution can also be defined as an allocation \( x \in F \) that maximizes \( \prod_{i} [v_i(x)]^{b_i} \), or equivalently (after taking a logarithm), that maximizes \( \sum_{i} b_i \log v_i(x) \); we will refer to these two equivalent objectives as the PF objectives. Note that, although the PF allocation need not be unique for a given instance, it does provide unique bidder valuations [38].

We also note that the PF solution is equivalent to the Nash bargaining solution. John Nash in his seminal paper [16] considered an axiomatic approach to bargaining and gave four axioms that any bargaining solution must satisfy. He showed that these four axioms yield a unique solution which is captured by a convex program; this convex program is equivalent to the one defined above for the PF solution. Another well-studied allocation rule which is equivalent to the PF allocation is the Competitive Equilibrium. Eisenberg [14] showed that if all agents have valuation functions that are quasi-concave and homogeneous of degree 1, then the competitive equilibrium is also captured by the same convex program as the one for the PF solution.

Given a valuation function reported from each bidder, we want to design mechanisms that output an allocation of items to bidders. We restrict ourselves to truthful mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms such that any false report from a bidder will never return her a more valuable allocation. Since proportional fairness cannot be implemented via truthful mechanisms, we will measure the performance of our mechanisms based on the extent to which they approximate this benchmark. More specifically, the approximation factor, or competitive factor of a mechanism will correspond to the minimum value of \( \rho(I) \) across all relevant instances \( I \), where
\[
\rho(I) = \min_{i \in N} \left\{ \frac{v_i(x)}{v_i(x^*)} \right\},
\]
and \( x, x^* \) are the allocation generated by the mechanism for instance \( I \) and the PF allocation of \( I \) respectively.
3 The Partial Allocation Mechanism

In this section, we define the Partial Allocation (PA) mechanism as a novel way to allocate divisible items to bidders with homogeneous valuation functions of degree one. We subsequently prove that this non-dictatorial mechanism not only achieves truthfulness, but also guarantees that every bidder will receive at least a $1/e$ fraction of the valuation that she deserves, according to the PF solution. This mechanism depends on a subroutine that computes the PF allocation for the problem instance at hand; we therefore later study the running time of this subroutine, as well as the robustness of our results in case this subroutine returns only approximate solutions.

The PA mechanism elicits the valuation function $v_i(\cdot)$ from each player $i$ and it computes the PF allocation $x^*$ considering all the players’ valuations. The final allocation $x$ output by the mechanism gives each player $i$ only a fraction $f_i$ of her PF bundle $x^*_i$, i.e. for every item $j$ of which the PF allocation assigned to her a portion of size $x^*_{ij}$, the PA mechanism instead assigns to her a portion of size $f_i \cdot x^*_{ij}$, where $f_i \in [0, 1]$ depends on the extent to which the presence of player $i$ inconveniences the other players; the value of $f_i$ may therefore vary across different players. The following steps give a more precise description of the mechanism.

**Algorithm 1:** The Partial Allocation mechanism.

1. Compute the PF allocation $x^*$ based on the reported bids.
2. For each player $i$, compute the PF allocation $x^*_{-i}$ that would arise in her absence.
3. Allocate to each player $i$ a fraction $f_i$ of her PF bundle $x^*$, where

$$f_i = \left( \frac{\prod_{i' \neq i} [v_{i'}(x^*)]^{b_{i'}}}{\prod_{i' \neq i} [v_{i'}(x^*_{-i})]^{b_{i'}}} \right)^{1/b_i}. \quad (2)$$

**Lemma 3.1.** The allocation $x$ produced by the PA mechanism is feasible.

*Proof.* Since the PF allocation $x^*$ is feasible, to verify that the allocation produced by the PA mechanism is also feasible, it suffices to show that $f_i \in [0, 1]$ for every bidder $i$. The fact that $f_i \geq 0$ is clear since both the numerator and the denominator are non-negative. To show that $f_i \leq 1$, note that

$$x^*_{-i} = \arg \max_{x' \in \mathcal{F}} \left\{ \prod_{i' \neq i} v_{i'}(x') \right\}.$$  

Since $x^*$ remains a feasible allocation ($x^* \in \mathcal{F}$) after removing bidder $i$ (we can just discard bidder $i$’s share), this implies

$$\prod_{i' \neq i} v_{i'}(x^*) \leq \prod_{i' \neq i} v_{i'}(x^*_{-i}).$$

\[ \square \]

3.1 Truthfulness

We now show that, despite the fact that this mechanism is not dictatorial and does not use monetary payments, it is still in the best interest of every player to report her true valuation function, irrespective of what the other players do.
Theorem 3.2. The PA mechanism is truthful.

Proof. In order to prove this theorem, we approach the PA mechanism from the perspective of some arbitrary player $i$. Let $\bar{v}_i(\cdot)$ denote the valuation function that each player $i' \neq i$ reports to the PA mechanism. We assume that the valuation functions reported by these players may differ from their true ones, $v_i(\cdot)$. Player $i$ is faced with the options of, either reporting her true valuation function $v_i(\cdot)$, or reporting some false valuation function $\bar{v}_i(\cdot)$. After every player has reported some valuation function, the PA mechanism computes the PF allocation with respect to these valuation functions; let $x_T$ denote the PF allocation that arises if player $i$ reports the truth and $x_L$ otherwise. Finally, player $i$ receives a fraction of what the computed PF allocation assigned to her, and how big or small this fraction will be depends on the computed PF allocation. Let $f_T$ denote the fraction of her allocation that player $i$ will receive if $x_T$ is the computed PF allocation and $f_L$ otherwise. Since the players have homogeneous valuation functions of degree one, what we need to show is that $f_T v_i(x_T) \geq f_L v_i(x_L)$, or equivalently that

$$[f_T v_i(x_T)]^{b_i} \geq [f_L v_i(x_L)]^{b_i}. \tag{3}$$

To verify that this inequality holds we use the fact that the PF allocation is the one that maximizes the product of the corresponding reported valuations. This means that

$$x_T = \arg \max_{x \in \mathcal{F}} \left\{ [v_i(x)]^{b_i} \cdot \prod_{i' \neq i} [\bar{v}_{i'}(x)]^{b_{i'}} \right\},$$

and since $x_L \in \mathcal{F}$, this implies that Inequality (3) holds, and hence reporting her true valuation function is a dominant strategy for every player $i$. \hfill \Box

The arguments used in the proof of Theorem 3.2 imply that, given the valuation functions reported by all the other players $i' \neq i$, player $i$ can effectively choose any bundle that she wishes, but for each bundle the mechanism defines what fraction player $i$ can keep. One can therefore think of the fraction of the bundle thrown away as a form of non-monetary “payment” that the player must suffer in exchange for that bundle, with different bundles matched to different payments. The fact that the PA mechanism is truthful implies that these payments, in the form of fractions, make the bundle allocated to her by allocation $x^*$ the most desirable one. We revisit this interpretation in Section 5.

3.2 Approximation

Before studying the approximation factor of the PA mechanism, we first state a lemma which will be useful for proving Theorem 3.4 (its proof is deferred to the Appendix).
Lemma 3.3. For any set of pairs \((\delta_i, \beta_i)\) with \(\beta_i \geq 1\) and \(\sum_i \beta_i \cdot \delta_i \leq b\) the following holds (where \(B = \sum_i \beta_i\))

\[
\prod_i (1 + \delta_i)^{\beta_i} \leq \left(1 + \frac{b}{B}\right)^B.
\]

Using this lemma we can now prove tight bounds for the approximation factor of the Partial Allocation mechanism. As we show in this proof, the approximation factor depends directly on the relative weights of the players. For simplicity in expressing the approximation factor, let \(b_{\text{min}}\) denote the smallest value of \(b_i\) across all bidders of an instance and let \(\bar{B} = (\sum_{i \in N} b_i) - b_{\text{min}}\) be the sum of the \(b_i\) values of all the other bidders. Finally, let \(\psi = \bar{B}/b_{\text{min}}\) denote the ratio of these two values.

Theorem 3.4. The approximation factor of the Partial Allocation mechanism for the class of problem instances of some given \(\psi\) value is exactly

\[
\left(1 + \frac{1}{\psi}\right)^{-\psi}.
\]

Proof. The PA mechanism allocates to each player \(i\) a fraction \(f_i\) of her PF allocation, and for the class of homogeneous valuation functions of degree one this means that the final valuation of player \(i\) will be \(v_i(x) = f_i \cdot v_i(x^*)\). The approximation factor guaranteed by the mechanism is therefore equal to \(\min_i \{f_i\}\). Without loss of generality, let player \(i\) be the one with the minimum value of \(f_i\). In the PF allocation \(x^* - i\) that the PA mechanism computes after removing player \(i\), every other player \(i'\) experiences a value of \(v_{i'}(x^* - i)\). Let \(d_{i'}\) denote the proportional change between the valuation of player \(i'\) for allocation \(x^*\) and allocation \(x^* - i\), i.e.

\[
v_{i'}(x^* - i) = (1 + d_{i'})v_{i'}(x^*).
\]

Substituting for \(v_{i'}(x^* - i)\) in Equation (2) yields:

\[
f_i = \left(\frac{1}{\prod_{i' \neq i} (1 + d_{i'})^{b_{i'}}}\right)^{1/b_i}.
\]

(4)

Since \(x^*\) is a PF allocation, Inequality (1) implies that

\[
\sum_{i' \in N} b_{i'}[v_{i'}(x^* - i) - v_{i'}(x^*)] \leq 0 \iff
\]

\[
\sum_{i' \neq i} b_{i'}d_{i'} + \frac{b_i[v_i(x^* - i) - v_i(x^*)]}{v_i(x^*)} \leq 0 \iff
\]

\[
\sum_{i' \neq i} b_{i'}d_{i'} \leq b_i.
\]

(5)

The last equivalence holds due to the fact that \(v_i(x^* - i) = 0\), since allocation \(x^* - i\) clearly assigns nothing to player \(i\).
Let $B_{-i} = \sum_{i' \neq i} b_{i'}$; using Inequality (5) and Lemma 3.3 (on substituting $b_i$ for $b$, $d_{i'}$ for $\delta_i$, $b_{i'}$ for $\beta_i$, and $B_{-i}$ for $B$), it follows from Equation (4) that

$$f_i \geq \left(1 + \frac{b_i}{B_{-i}}\right)^{-\frac{B_{-i}}{b_i}}. \quad (6)$$

To verify that this bound is tight, consider any instance with just one item and the given $\psi$ value. The PF solution dictates that each player should be receiving a fraction of the item proportional to the player’s $b_i$ value. The removal of a player $i$ therefore leads to a proportional increase of exactly $b_i/B_{-i}$ for each of the other players’ PF valuation. The PA mechanism therefore assigns to every player $i$ a fraction of her PF allocation which is equal to the right hand side of Inequality (6). The player with the smallest $b_i$ value receives the smallest fraction.

The approximation factor of Theorem 3.4 implies that $f_i \geq 1/2$ for instances with two players having equal $b_i$ values, and $f_i \geq 1/e$ even when $\psi$ goes to infinity; we therefore get the following corollary.

**Corollary 3.5.** The Partial Allocation mechanism always yields an allocation $x$ such that for every participating player $i$

$$v_i(x) \geq \frac{1}{e} \cdot v_i(x^*).$$

To complement this approximation factor, we now provide a negative result showing that, even for the special case of additive linear valuations, no truthful mechanism can guarantee an approximation factor better than $\frac{n+1}{2n}$ for problem instances with $n$ players.

**Theorem 3.6.** There is no truthful mechanism that can guarantee an approximation factor greater than $\frac{n+1}{2n} + \epsilon$ for any constant $\epsilon > 0$ for all $n$-player problem instances, even if the valuations are restricted to being additive linear.

**Proof.** For an arbitrary real value of $n > 1$, let $\rho = \frac{n+1}{2n}$, and assume that $Q$ is a truthful resource allocation mechanism that guarantees a $(\rho + \epsilon)$ approximation for all $n$-player problem instances, where $\epsilon$ is a positive constant. This mechanism receives as input the bidders’ valuations and it returns a valid (fractional) allocation of the items. We will define $n+1$ different input instances for this mechanism, each of which will consist of $n$ bidders and $m = (k+1)n$ items, where $k > \frac{\epsilon}{\rho}$ will take very large values. In order to prove the theorem, we will then show that $Q$ cannot simultaneously achieve this approximation guarantee for all these instances, leading to a contradiction. For simplicity we will refer to each bidder with a number from 1 to $n$, to each item with a number from 1 to $(k+1)n$, and to each problem instance with a number from 1 to $n+1$.

We start by defining the first $n$ problem instances. For $i \leq n$, let problem instance $i$ be as follows: Every bidder $i' \neq i$ has a valuation of $kn+1$ for item $i'$ and a valuation of 1 for every other item; bidder $i$ has a valuation of 1 for all items. In other words, all bidders except bidder $i$ have a strong preference for just one item, which is different for each one of them. The PF allocation for such additive linear valuations dictates that every bidder $i' \neq i$ is allocated only item $i'$, while bidder $i$ is allocated all the remaining $kn+1$ items. Since $Q$ achieves a $\rho + \epsilon$ approximation for this instance, it needs to provide bidder $i$ with an allocation which the bidder values at least at $(\rho + \epsilon) (kn+1)$. In order to achieve this, mechanism $Q$ can assign to this bidder fractions of the set $M_{-i}$ of the $n-1$ items that the PF solution allocates to the other bidders as well as fractions
of the set $M_i$ of the $kn + 1$ items that the PF allocation allocates to bidder $i$. Even if all of the $n - 1$ items of $M_{i-1}$ were fully allocated to bidder $i$, the mechanism would still need to assign to this bidder an allocation of value at least $(\rho + \epsilon)(kn + 1) - (n - 1)$ using items from $M_i$. Since $k > \frac{2}{\epsilon}$, $n - 1 < \frac{\epsilon}{2}(kn + 1)$, and therefore mechanism $Q$ will need to allocate to bidder $i$ a fractional assignment of items in $M_i$ that the bidder values at least at $(\rho + \frac{\epsilon}{2})(kn + 1)$. This implies that there must exist at least one item in $M_i$ of which bidder $i$ is allocated a fraction of size at least $(\rho + \frac{\epsilon}{2})$. Since all the items in $M_i$ are identical and the numbering of the items is arbitrary, we can, without loss of generality, assume that this item is item $i$. We have therefore shown that, for every instance $i \leq n$ mechanism $Q$ will have to allocate to bidder $i$ of problem instance $n + 1$ with at least the value that such a deviation would provide her with. One can quickly verify that, even if mechanism $Q$ when faced with problem instance $i$ provided bidder $i$ with no more than a $(\rho + \frac{\epsilon}{2})$ fraction of item $i$, still such a deviation would provide bidder $i$ with a valuation of at least $(\rho + \frac{\epsilon}{2})(kn + 1)$.

The first term of the left hand side comes from the fraction of item $i$ that the bidder receives and the second term comes from the average fraction of the remaining items. If we substitute $\rho = \frac{n + 1}{2n}$, we get that the truthfulness of $Q$ implies that every bidder $i$ of problem instance $n + 1$ will have to receive an allocation of value at least

$$\left(\rho + \frac{\epsilon}{2}\right)(kn + 1) + \left(\rho + \frac{\epsilon}{2}\right)kn \geq (\rho + \frac{\epsilon}{2})2kn.$$ 

For any given constant value of $\epsilon$ though, since $k > \frac{2}{\epsilon}$ and $n > 1$, every bidder will need to be assigned an allocation that she values at more than $kn + k + 2$, which is greater than the valuation of $kn + k + 1$ that the player receives in the PF solution. This is obviously a contradiction since the PF solution is Pareto efficient and there cannot exist any other allocation for which all bidders receive a strictly greater valuation.

Theorem 3.6 implies that, even if all the players have equal $b_i$ values, no truthful mechanism can guarantee a greater than $3/4$ approximation even for instances with just two bidders, and this bound drops further as the number of bidders increases, finally converging to $1/2$. To complement the statement of Corollary 3.5, we therefore get the following corollary.

**Corollary 3.7.** No truthful mechanism can guarantee that it will always yield an allocation $x$ such that for any $\epsilon > 0$ and for every participating player $i$

$$v_i(x) \geq \left(\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon\right) \cdot v_i(x^*).$$
3.3 Envy-Freeness

We now consider the question of whether the outcomes that the Partial Allocation mechanism yields are envy-free; we show that, for two well studied types of valuation functions this is indeed the case, thus providing further evidence of the fairness properties of this mechanism. We start by showing that, if the bidders have additive linear valuations, then the outcome that the PA mechanism outputs is also envy-free.

Theorem 3.8. The PA mechanism is envy-free for additive linear bidder valuations.

Proof. Let \( x^* \) denote the PF allocation including all the bidders, with each bidder’s valuations scaled so that \( v_i(x^*) = 1 \). Let \( v_j(x_i^*) \) denote the value of bidder \( i \) for \( x_j^* \), the PF share of bidder \( j \) in \( x^* \), and let \( x_{-i}^* \) denote the PF allocation that arises after removing some bidder \( i \). The PA mechanism allocates each (unweighted) bidder \( i \) a fraction \( f_i \) of her PF share, where

\[
f_i = \frac{\prod_{k \neq i} [v_k(x_i^*)]}{\prod_{k \neq i} [v_k(x_{-i}^*)]} = \frac{1}{\prod_{k \neq i} [v_k(x_{-i}^*)]}.
\]

In order to prove that the PA mechanism is envy-free, we need to show that for every bidder \( i \), and for all \( j \neq i \), \( f_i v_i(x^*) \geq f_j v_j(x_j^*) \), or equivalently

\[
\frac{1}{\prod_{k \neq i} [v_k(x_{-i}^*)]} \geq \frac{v_i(x_j^*)}{\prod_{k \neq j} [v_k(x_{-j}^*)]} \iff \prod_{k \neq j} [v_k(x_{-j}^*)] \geq v_i(x_j^*) \prod_{k \neq i} [v_k(x_{-i}^*)].
\]

(7)

To prove the above inequality, we will modify allocation \( x_{-i}^* \) so as to create an allocation \( x_{-j} \) such that

\[
\prod_{k \neq j} [v_k(x_{-j})] \geq v_i(x_j^*) \prod_{k \neq i} [v_k(x_{-i}^*)].
\]

(8)

Clearly, for any feasible allocation \( x_{-j} \) it must be the case that

\[
\prod_{k \neq j} [v_k(x_{-j})] \geq \prod_{k \neq j} [v_k(x_{-j})],
\]

(9)

since \( x_{-j} \) is, by definition, the feasible allocation that maximizes this product. Therefore, combining Inequalities (8) and (9) implies Inequality (7).

To construct allocation \( x_{-j} \), we use allocation \( x_{-i}^* \) and we define the following weighted directed graph \( G \) based on \( x_{-i}^* \): the set of vertices corresponds to the set of bidders, and a directed edge from the vertex for bidder \( j \) to that for bidder \( k \) exists if and only if \( x_{-i}^* \) allocates to bidder \( j \) portions of items that were instead allocated to bidder \( k \) in \( x^* \). The weight of such an edge is equal to the total value that bidder \( j \) sees in all these portions. Since the valuations of all bidders are scaled so that \( v_j(x^*) = 1 \) for all \( j \), this implies that, if the weight of some edge \((j, k)\) is \( v\) (w.r.t. these scaled valuations), then the total value of bidder \( k \) for those same portions that bidder \( j \) values at \( v \), is at least \( v \). If that were not the case, then \( x^* \) would not have allocated those portions to bidder \( k \); allocating them to bidder \( j \) instead would lead to a positive aggregate proportional change to the valuations. This means that we can assume, without loss of generality, that the graph is a directed acyclic one; if not, we can rearrange the allocation so as to remove any directed cycles from this graph without decreasing any bidder’s valuation.
Also note that for every bidder $k \neq i$ it must be the case that $v_k(x^*_{-i}) \geq v_k(x^*)$. To verify this fact, assume that it is not true, and let $k$ be the bidder with the minimum value $v_k(x^*_{-i})$. Since $v_k(x^*_{-i}) < v_k(x^*) = 1$, it must be the case that $x^*_{-i}$ does not allocate to bidder $k$ all of her PF share according to $x^*$, thus the vertex for bidder $k$ has incoming edges of positive weight in the directed acyclic graph $G$, and it therefore belongs to some directed path. The very first vertex of this path is a source of $G$ that corresponds to some bidder $s$; the fact that this vertex has no incoming edges implies that $v_s(x^*_{-i}) \geq v_s(x^*) = 1$. Since $v_k(x^*_{-i}) < 1$ we can deduce that there exists some directed edge $(\alpha, \beta)$ along the path from $s$ to $k$ such that $v_\alpha(x^*_{-i}) > v_\beta(x^*_{-i})$. Returning some of the portions contributing to this edge from bidder $\alpha$ to bidder $\beta$ will lead to a positive aggregate proportional change to the valuations, contradicting that $x^*_{-i}$ is the PF allocation excluding bidder $i$. Having shown that $v_k(x^*_{-i}) \geq v_k(x^*)$ for every bidder $k$ other than $i$, we can now deduce that the total weight of incoming edges for the vertex in $G$ corresponding to any bidder $k \neq i$ is at most as much as the total weight of the outgoing edges. Finally, this also implies that the only sink of $G$ will have to be the vertex for bidder $i$.

The first step of our construction starts from allocation $x^*_{-i}$ and it reallocates some of the $x^*_{-i}$ allocation, leading to a new allocation $\bar{x}$. Using the directed subtree of $G$ rooted at the vertex of bidder $j$, we reduce to zero the weights of the edges leaving $j$ by reducing the allocation at $j$, increasing the allocation at $i$, and suitably changing the allocation of other bidders. More specifically, we start by returning all the portions that bidder $j$ was allocated in $x^*_{-i}$ but not in $x^*$, back to the bidders who were allocated these portions in $x^*$. These bidders to whom some portions were returned then return portions of equal value that they too were allocated in $x^*_{-i}$ but not in $x^*$; this is possible since, for each such bidder, the total incoming edge weight of its vertex is outweighed by the total outgoing edge weight. We repeat this process until the sink, the vertex for bidder $i$, is reached. One can quickly verify that

$$v_i(\bar{x}) \geq v_j(x^*_{-i}) - v_j(\bar{x});$$

(10)

in words, the value that bidder $i$ gained in this transition from $x^*_{-i}$ to $\bar{x}$ is at least as large as the value that bidder $j$ lost in that same transition. Finally, in allocation $\bar{x}$, whatever value $v_j(\bar{x})$ bidder $j$ is left with comes only from portions that were part of her PF share in $x^*$.

Bidder $j$’s total valuation for any portions of her PF share in $x^*$ that are allocated to other bidders in $x^*_{-i}$ is equal to $1 - v_j(\bar{x})$. Thus, bidder $i$’s valuation for those same portions will be at most $1 - v_j(\bar{x})$; otherwise modifying $x^*$ by allocating these portions to $i$ would lead to a positive aggregate change to the valuations. This means that for bidder $i$ the portions remaining with bidder $j$ in allocation $\bar{x}$ have value at least $v_i(x^*_j) - (1 - v_j(\bar{x}))$. We conclude the construction of allocation $x_{-j}$ by allocating all the remaining portions allocated to bidder $j$ in $\bar{x}$ to bidder $i$, leading to

$$v_i(x_{-j}) \geq v_i(\bar{x}) + v_i(x^*_j) - (1 - v_j(\bar{x}))$$
$$\geq v_j(x^*_{-i}) - v_j(\bar{x}) + v_i(x^*_j) - (1 - v_j(\bar{x}))$$
$$\geq v_j(x^*_{-i}) - 1 + v_i(x^*_j)$$
$$\geq |v_j(x^*_{-i}) - 1|v_i(x^*_j) + v_i(x^*_j)$$
$$= v_j(x^*_{-i})v_i(x^*_j).$$

The second inequality is deduced by substituting from Inequality (10); the last inequality can be verified by using the fact that $v_i(x^*_j) \leq 1$, and multiplying both sides of this inequality with the
non-negative value \( v_j(x^*_{-i}) - 1 \), leading to \([v_j(x^*_{-i}) - 1]v_i(x^*) \leq v_j(x^*_{-i}) - 1 \). Also note that for all \( k \notin \{i, j\} \), \( v_k(x_{-j}) = v_k(x^*_{-j}) \). We therefore conclude that the second inequality of (8) is true. The first inequality is of course also true since both \( x^*_{-j} \) and \( x_{-j} \) are feasible, but the former is, by definition, the one that maximizes that product.

Following the same proof structure we can now also show that the PA mechanism is envy-free when the bidders have Leontief valuations.

**Theorem 3.9.** The PA mechanism is envy-free for Leontief bidder valuations.

**Proof.** Just as in the proof of Theorem 3.8, let \( x^* \) denote the PF allocation including all the bidders, with each bidder’s valuations scaled so that \( v_i(x^*) = 1 \). Also, let \( v_i(x^*_{j}) \) denote the value of bidder \( i \) for \( x^*_{j} \), the PF share of bidder \( j \) in \( x^* \), and let \( x^*_{-i} \) denote the PF allocation that arises after removing some bidder \( i \).

Following the steps of the proof of Theorem 3.8 we can reduce the problem of showing that the PA mechanism is envy-free to constructing an allocation \( x_{-j} \) that satisfies Inequality (8), i.e. such that

\[
\prod_{k \neq j} [v_k(x^*_{-j})] \geq \prod_{k \neq j} [v_k(x_{-j})] \geq v_i(x^*_{j}) \prod_{k \neq i} [v_k(x^*_{-i})].
\]

To construct allocation \( x_{-j} \), we start from allocation \( x^*_{-i} \) and we reallocate the bundle of item fractions allocated to bidder \( j \) in \( x^*_{-i} \) to bidder \( i \) instead, while maintaining the same allocations for all other bidders. Therefore, after simplifying the latter inequality using the fact that \( v_k(x_{-j}) = v_k(x^*_{-i}) \) for all \( k \neq i, j \), what we need to show is that

\[
v_i(x_{-j}) \geq v_i(x^*_{j})v_j(x^*_{-i}).
\]

Note that, given the structure of Leontief valuations, every bidder is interested in bundles of item fractions that satisfy specific proportions. This means that the bundle of item fractions allocated to bidder \( j \) in \( x^* \) and the one allocated to her in \( x^*_{-i} \) both satisfy the same proportions; that is, there exists some constant \( c \) such that, for every one of the items, bidder \( j \) receives in \( x^*_{-i} \) exactly \( c \) times the amount that she receives in \( x^* \). As a result, given the fact that Leontief valuations are homogeneous of degree one, \( v_j(x^*_{-i}) = c \cdot v_j(x^*) = c \) (using the fact that \( v_j(x^*) = 1 \)). Similarly, since \( x_{-j} \) allocates to bidder \( i \) the bundle of bidder \( j \) in \( x^*_{-i} \), and using the homogeneous structure of Leontief valuations, this implies that \( v_i(x_{-j}) = c \cdot v_i(x^*) \). Substituting these two equalities in Inequality (11) verifies that the inequality is true, thus concluding the proof.

### 3.4 Running Time and Robustness

The PA mechanism has reduced the problem of truthfully implementing a constant factor approximation of the PF allocation to computing exact PF allocations for several different problem instances, as this is the only subroutine that the mechanism calls. If the valuation functions of the players are affine, then there is a polynomial time algorithm to compute the exact PF allocation [39, 40].

We now show that, even if the PF solution can be only approximately computed in polynomial time, our truthfulness and approximation related statements are robust with respect to such approximations (all the proofs of this subsection are deferred to the Appendix). More specifically,
we assume that the PA mechanism uses a polynomial time algorithm that computes a feasible allocation \(\tilde{x}\) instead of \(x^*\) such that

\[
\left[ \prod_i [v_i(\tilde{x})]^{b_i} \right]^{1/B} \geq \left[ (1 - \epsilon) \prod_i [v_i(x^*)]^{b_i} \right]^{1/B}, \quad \text{where } B = \sum_{i=1}^n b_i.
\]

Using this algorithm, the PA mechanism can be adapted as follows:

**Algorithm 2:** The Approximate Partial Allocation mechanism.

1. Compute the approximate PF allocation \(\tilde{x}\) based on the reported bids.
2. For each player \(i\), remove her and compute the approximate PF allocation \(\tilde{x}_{-i}\) that would arise in her absence.
3. Allocate to each player \(i\) a fraction \(\tilde{f}_i\) of everything that she receives according to \(\tilde{x}\), where

\[
\tilde{f}_i = \min \left\{ 1, \left( \frac{\prod_{i' \neq i} [v_{i'}(\tilde{x})]^{b_{i'}}}{\prod_{i' \neq i} [v_{i'}(\tilde{x}_{-i})]^{b_{i'}}} \right)^{1/b_i} \right\}.
\] (12)

For this adapted version of the PA mechanism to remain feasible, we need to make sure that \(\tilde{f}_i\) remains less than or equal to 1. Even if, for some reason, the allocation \(\tilde{x}_{-i}\) computed by the approximation algorithm does not satisfy this property, the adapted mechanism will then choose \(\tilde{f}_i = 1\) instead.

We start by showing two lemmas verifying that this adapted version of the PA mechanism is robust both with respect to the approximation factor it guarantees and with respect to the truthfulness guarantee.

**Lemma 3.10.** The approximation factor of the adapted PA mechanism for the class of problem instances of some given \(\psi\) value is at least

\[
(1 - \epsilon) \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\psi} \right)^{-\psi}.
\]

**Lemma 3.11.** If a player misreports her preferences to the adapted PA mechanism, she may increase her valuation by at most a factor \((1 - \epsilon)^{-2}\).

Finally, we show that if the valuation functions are, for example, concave and homogeneous of degree one, then a feasible approximate PF allocation can indeed be computed in polynomial time.

**Lemma 3.12.** For concave homogeneous valuation functions of degree one, there exists an algorithm that computes a feasible allocation \(\tilde{x}\) in time polynomial in \(\log 1/\epsilon\) and the problem size, such that

\[
\prod_i [v_i(\tilde{x})]^{b_i} \geq (1 - \epsilon) \prod_i [v_i(x^*)]^{b_i}.
\]
3.5 Extension to General Homogeneous Valuations

We can actually extend most of the results that we have shown for homogeneous valuation functions of degree one to any valuation function that can be expressed as $v_i(f \cdot x) = g_i(f) \cdot v_i(x)$, where $g_i(\cdot)$ is some increasing invertible function; for homogeneous valuation functions of degree $d$, this function is $g_i(f) = f^d$. If this function is known for each bidder, we can then adapt the PA mechanism as follows: instead of allocating to bidder $i$ a fraction $f_i$ of her allocation according to $x^*$ as defined in Equation (2), we instead allocate to this bidder a fraction $g_i^{-1}(f_i)$, where $g_i^{-1}(\cdot)$ is the inverse function of $g_i(\cdot)$. If, for example, some bidder has a homogeneous valuation function of degree $d$, then allocating her a fraction $f_i^{1/d}$ of her PF allocation has the desired effect and both truthfulness and the same approximation factor guarantees still hold. The idea behind this transformation is that all that we need in order to achieve truthfulness and the approximation factor is to be able to discard some fraction of a bidder’s allocation knowing exactly what fraction of her valuation this will correspond to.

4 The Strong Demand Matching Mechanism

The main result of the previous section shows that one can guarantee a good constant factor approximation for any problem instance within a very large class of bidder valuations. The subsequent impossibility result shows that, even if we restrict ourselves to problem instances with additive linear bidder valuations, no truthful mechanism can guarantee more than a $1/2$ approximation.

In this section we study the question of whether one can achieve even better factors when restricted to some well-motivated class of instances. We focus on additive linear valuations, and we provide a positive answer to this question for problem instances where every item is highly demanded. More formally, we consider problem instances for which the PF price (or equivalently the competitive equilibrium price) of every item is large when the budget of every player is fixed to one unit of scrip money\(^5\). The motivation behind this class of instances comes from problems such as the one that arose with the Czech privatization auctions \cite{3}. For such instances, where the number of players is much higher than the number of items, one naturally anticipates that all item prices will be high in equilibrium.

For the rest of the chapter we assume that the weights of all players are equal and that their valuations are additive linear. Let $p^*_j$ denote the PF price of item $j$ when every bidder $i$’s budget $b_i$ is equal to 1. Our main result in this section is the following:

**Theorem 4.1.** For additive linear valuations there exists a truthful mechanism that achieves an approximation factor of $\min_j \left\{ \frac{p^*_j}{\lceil p^*_j \rceil} \right\}$.

Note that if $k = \min_j p^*_j$, then this approximation factor is at least $k/(k + 1)$.

We now describe our solution which we call the Strong Demand Matching mechanism (SDM). Informally speaking, SDM starts by giving every bidder a unit amount of scrip money. It then aims to discover **minimal** item prices such that the demand of each bidder at these prices can be satisfied using (a fraction of) just one item. In essence, our mechanism is restricted to computing allocations that assign each bidder to just one item, and this restriction of the output space renders

\(^5\)Remark: Our mechanism does not make this assumption, but the approximation guarantees are much better with this assumption.
the mechanism truthful and gives an approximation guarantee much better than that of the PA mechanism for instances where every item is highly demanded.

The procedure used by our mechanism is reminiscent of the method utilized by Demange et al. for multi-unit auctions [41]. Recall that this method increases the prices of all over-demanded items uniformly until the set $R$ of over-demanded items changes, iterating this process until $R$ becomes empty. At that point, bidders are matched to preferred items. For our setting, each bidder will seek to spend all her money, and we employ an analogous rising price methodology, again making allocations when the set of over-demanded items is empty. In our setting, the price increases are multiplicative rather than additive, however. This approach also has some commonality with the algorithm of Devanur et al. [39] for computing the competitive equilibrium for divisible items and bidders with additive linear valuations. Their algorithm also proceeds by increasing the prices of over-demanded items multiplicatively. Of course, their algorithm does not yield a truthful mechanism. Also, in order to achieve polynomial running time in computing the competitive equilibrium, their algorithm needs, at any one time, to be increasing the prices of a carefully selected subset of these items; this appears to make their algorithm quite dissimilar to ours. Next we specify our mechanism in more detail.

Let $p_j$ denote the price of item $j$, and let the bang per buck that bidder $i$ gets from item $j$ equal $v_{ij}/p_j$. We say that item $j$ is an MBB item of bidder $i$ if she gets the maximum bang per buck from that item. For a given price vector $p$, let the demand graph $D(p)$ be a bipartite graph with bidders on one side and items on the other, such that there is an edge between bidder $i$ and item $j$ if and only if $j$ is an MBB item of bidder $i$. We call $c_j = |p_j|$ the capacity of item $j$ when its price is $p_j$, and we say an assignment of bidders to items is valid if it matches each bidder to one of her MBB items and no item $j$ is matched to more than $c_j$ bidders. Given a valid assignment $A$, we say an item $j$ is reachable from bidder $i$ if there exists an alternating path $(i, j_1, i_1, j_2, i_2, \cdots, j_k, i_k, j)$ in the graph $D(p)$ such that edges $(i_1, j_1), \cdots, (i_k, j_k)$ lie in the assignment $A$. Finally, let $d(R)$ be the collection of bidders with all their MBB items in set $R$. Using these notions, we define the Strong Demand Matching mechanism in Figure 3.

### 4.1 Running time

We first explain how to carry out Steps 6-14. Set $R$ can be computed using a breadth-first-search like algorithm. To determine when the event of Step 8 takes place, we just need to know the smallest $\lceil p_j/p_j \rceil$ ratio over all items whose price is being increased. For the event of Step 10, we need to calculate, for each bidder in $d(R)$, the ratio of the bang per buck for her MBB items and for the items outside the set $R$.

In terms of running time, if $c(R) = \sum_{j \in R} c_j$ denotes the total capacity in $R$, it is not difficult to see that if $U$ is non-empty, $|d(R)| > c(R)$. Note that each time either the event of Step 8 or the event of Step 13 occurs, $c(R)$ increases by at least 1, and thus, using the alternating path from a bidder in the set $U$ to the corresponding item, we can increase the number of matched bidders by at least 1; this means that this can occur at most $n$ times. The only other events are the unions (of connected components in graph $D(p)$) resulting from the event of Step 11. Between successive iterations of either Step 8 or 13, there can be at most $\min(n, m)$ iterations of Step 11. Thus there are $O(n \cdot \min(n, m))$ iterations of Step 11 overall and $O(n)$ iterations of Steps 8 and 13.

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6 Note that for each bidder there could be multiple MBB items and that in the PF solution bidders are only allocated such MBB items.
Algorithm 3: The Strong Demand Matching mechanism.

1. Initialize the price of every item \( j \) to \( p_j = 1 \).
2. Find a valid assignment maximizing the number of matched bidders.
3. \textbf{if all the bidders are matched then}
   4. conclude with Step 15.
5. \textbf{Let } \( U \) \textbf{be the set of bidders who are not matched in Step 2.}
6. \textbf{Let } \( R \) \textbf{be the set of all items reachable from bidders in the set } \( U \).
7. Increase the price of each item \( j \) in \( R \) from \( p_j \) to \( r \cdot p_j \), where \( r \geq 1 \) is the minimum value for which one of the following events takes place:
   8. \textbf{if the price of an item in } \( R \) \textbf{reaches an integral value then}
   9. continue with Step 2.
10. \textbf{if the set of } \text{MBB} \text{ items of some bidder } \( i \in d(R) \) \textbf{increases, causing the set } \( R \) \textbf{to grow then}
    11. \textbf{if for each item } \( j \) \textbf{added to } \( R \), \textbf{the number of bidders already matched to it equals } \( c_j \) \textbf{then}
        continue with Step 6.
    12. \textbf{if some item } \( j \) \textbf{added to } \( R \) \textbf{has } \( c_j \) \textbf{greater than the number of bidders matched to it then}
        continue with Step 2.
13. Bidders matched to some item \( j \) are allocated a fraction \( 1/p_j \) of it.

4.2 Truthfulness and Approximation

The proofs of the truthfulness and the approximation of the SDM mechanism use the following lemma which states that the prices computed by the mechanism are the minimum prices supporting a valid assignment. An analogous result was shown in [41] for a multi-unit auction of non-divisible items. We provide an algorithmic argument.

Lemma 4.2. For any problem instance, if \( p \geq 1 \) is a set of prices for which there exists a valid assignment, then the prices \( q \) computed by the SDM mechanism will satisfy \( q \leq p \).

Proof. Aiming for a contradiction, assume that \( q_j > p_j \) for some item \( j \), and let \( \tilde{q} \) be the maximal price vector that the SDM mechanism reaches before increasing the price of some item \( j' \) beyond \( p_{j'} \) for the first time. In other words, \( \tilde{q} \leq p \) and \( \tilde{q}_{j'} = p_{j'} \). Also, let \( S = \{ j \in M \mid \tilde{q}_j = p_j \} \), which implies that \( \tilde{q}_j < p_j \) for all \( j \notin S \). Clearly, any bidder \( i \) who has MBB items in \( S \) at prices \( \tilde{q} \) will not be interested in any other item at prices \( p \). This implies that the valid assignment that exists for prices \( p \) assigns every such bidder to one of her MBB items \( j \in S \). Therefore, the total capacity of items in \( S \) at prices \( \tilde{q} \) is large enough to support all these bidders and hence no item in \( S \) will be over-demanded at prices \( \tilde{q} \). As a result, the SDM mechanism will not increase the price of any item in \( S \), which leads us to a contradiction.

Using this lemma we can now prove the statements regarding the truthfulness and the approximation factor of SDM; the following two lemmata imply Theorem 4.1.

Lemma 4.3. The SDM mechanism is truthful.

Proof. Given a problem instance, fix some bidder \( i \) and let \( x' \) and \( q' \) denote the assignment and the prices that the SDM mechanism outputs instead of \( x \) and \( q \) when this bidder reports a valuation vector \( v'_i \) instead of her true valuation vector \( v_i \).
If the item \( j \) to which bidder \( i \) is assigned in \( x' \) is one of her MBB items w.r.t. her true valuations \( v_i \) and prices \( q' \), then \( x' \) would be a valid assignment for prices \( q' \) even if the bidder had not lied. Lemma 4.2 therefore implies that \( q \leq q' \). Since the item to which bidder \( i \) is assigned by \( x \) is an MBB item and \( q \leq q' \), we can conclude that \( v_i(x) \geq v_i(x') \).

If on the other hand item \( j \) is not an MBB item w.r.t. the true valuations of bidder \( i \) and prices \( q' \), we consider an alternative valid assignment and prices. Starting from prices \( q' \), we run the steps of the SDM mechanism assuming bidder \( i \) has reported her true valuations \( v_i \), and we consider the assignment \( \bar{x} \) and the prices \( \bar{q} \) that the mechanism would yield upon termination. Assignment \( \bar{x} \) would clearly be valid for prices \( \bar{q} \) if bidder \( i \) had reported the truth; therefore Lemma 4.2 implies \( q \leq \bar{q} \) and thus \( v_i(x) \geq v_i(\bar{x}) \). As a result, to conclude the proof it suffices to show that \( v_i(x') \geq v_i(x) \).

To verify this fact, we show that \( q_j' = \bar{q}_j \), implying that \( \bar{x} \) allocates to \( i \) (a fraction of) some item which she values at least as much as a \( 1/q_j' \) fraction of item \( j \).

Consider the assignment \( x'_{-i} \) that matches all bidders \( i' \neq i \) according to \( x' \) and leaves bidder \( i \) unmatched. In the graph \( D(q') \), if item \( j \) is reachable from bidder \( i \) given the valid assignment \( x'_{-i} \), then all bidders would be matched by the very first execution of Step 1 of the mechanism. This is true because the capacity of item \( j \) according to prices \( q' \) is greater than the number of bidders matched to it in \( x'_{-i} \). The alternating path \((i, j_1, i_1, j_2, i_2, \cdots, j_k, i_k, j)\) implied by the reachability can therefore be used to ensure that bidder \( i \) is matched to an MBB item as well; this is achieved by matching \( i \) to \( j_1, i_1 \) to \( j_2 \) and so on. Otherwise, if not all bidders can be matched in that very first step of the SDM mechanism, the mechanism can instead match the bidders according to \( x'_{-i} \) and set \( U = \{ i \} \). Before the price of item \( j \) can be increased, Step 10 must add this item to the set \( R \). If this happens though, item \( j \) becomes reachable from bidder \( i \) thus causing an alternating path to form, and the next execution of Step 1 of the mechanism yields a valid assignment before \( q_j' \) is ever increased.

\[ \text{Lemma 4.4.} \quad \text{The SDM mechanism achieves an approximation factor of } \min_j \left\{ \frac{p_j^*}{\lceil p_j^* \rceil} \right\}. \]

**Proof.** We start by showing that there must exist a valid assignment at prices \( fp^* \), where \( p^* \) corresponds to the PF prices and \( f = \max_j \left[ \frac{p_j^*}{p_j^*} \right] \). Given any PF allocation \( x^* \), we consider the bipartite graph on items and bidders that has an edge between a bidder and an item if and only if \( x^* \) assigns a portion of the item to that bidder. If there exists a cycle in this graph, one can remove an edge in this cycle by reallocating along the cycle while maintaining the valuation of every bidder. To verify that this is possible, note that all the items that a bidder is connected to by an edge are MBB items for this bidder, and therefore the bidder is indifferent regarding how her spending is distributed among them. Hence w.l.o.g. we can assume that the graph of \( x^* \) is a forest.

For a given tree in this forest, root it at an arbitrary bidder. For each bidder in this tree, assign her to one of her child items, if any, and otherwise to her parent item. Note that the MBB items for each bidder at prices \( fp^* \) are the same as at prices \( p^* \), so every bidder is assigned to one of her MBB items. Therefore, in order to conclude that this assignment is valid at prices \( fp^* \) it is sufficient to show that the capacity constraints are satisfied. The fact that \( \left[ fp_j^* \right] \geq \lceil p_j^* \rceil \) implies that \( \left[ fp_j^* \right] \geq \lceil p_j^* \rceil \), so we just need to show that, for each item \( j \), at most \( \lceil p_j^* \rceil \) bidders are assigned to it. To verify this fact, note that any bidder who is assigned to her parent item does not have child items so, in \( x^* \), she is spending all of her unit of scrip money on that parent item. In other

\[ ^7 \text{Note that this may not be the only way in which the SDM mechanism can proceed but, since the bidders' valuations for the final outcome are unique, this is without loss of generality.} \]
words, for any item \( j \), the only bidder that may be assigned to it without having contributed to an increase of \( j \)'s PF price by 1 is the parent bidder of \( j \) in the tree; thus, the total number of bidders is at most \( \lceil p_j^* \rceil \).

Now, let \( q \) and \( x \) denote the prices and the assignment computed by the SDM mechanism; by Lemma 4.2, since there exists a valid assignment at prices \( fp^* \), this implies that \( q \leq fp^* \). The fact that the SDM mechanism assigns each bidder to one of her MBB items at prices \( q \) implies that \( v_i(x) = \max_j \{v_{ij}/q_j\} \). On the other hand, let \( r \) be an MBB item of bidder \( i \) at the PF prices \( p^* \). If bidder \( i \) had \( b_i \) units of scrip money to spend on such MBB items, this would mean that \( v_i(x^*) = b_i(v_{ir}/p_i^*) \), so, since \( b_i = 1 \), this implies that \( v_i(x^*) = v_{ir}/p_i^* \). Using this inequality along with the fact that \( q_j \leq fp_j^* \) for all items \( j \), we can show that

\[
v_i(x) = \max_j \left\{ \frac{v_{ij}}{q_j} \right\} \geq \frac{v_{ir}}{fp_i^*} = \frac{1}{f} \cdot v_i(x^*),
\]

which implies that \( v_i(x) \geq \min_j \{p_j^*/[fp_j^*]\} \cdot v_i(x^*) \) for any bidder \( i \).

\[
\text{5 Connections to Mechanism Design with Money}
\]

In hindsight, a closer look at the mechanisms of this chapter reveals an interesting connection between our work and known results from the literature on mechanism design with money. What we show in this section is that one can uncover useful interpretations of money-free mechanisms as mechanisms with actual monetary payments by instead considering appropriate logarithmic transformations of the bidders’ valuations. In what follows, we expand on this connection for the two mechanisms that we have proposed.

**Partial Allocation Mechanism** We begin by showing that one can actually interpret the item fractions discarded by the Partial Allocation mechanism as VCG payments. The valuation of player \( i \) for the PA mechanism outcome is \( v_i(x) = f_i \cdot v_i(x^*) \), or

\[
v_i(x) = \left( \frac{\prod_{j' \neq i} [v_{ij'}(x^*)]^{b_{ij'}}}{\prod_{j' \neq i} [v_{ij'}(x^*_{-i})]^{b_{ij'}}} \right)^{1/b_i} \cdot v_i(x^*).
\]  

(13)

Taking a logarithm on both sides of Equation (13) and then multiplying them by \( b_i \) yields

\[
b_i \log v_i(x) = b_i \log v_i(x^*) - \left( \sum_{j' \neq i} b_{ij'} \log v_{ij'}(x^*_{-i}) - \sum_{j' \neq i} b_{ij'} \log v_{ij'}(x^*) \right).
\]  

(14)

Now, instead of focusing on each bidder \( i \)'s objective in terms of maximizing her valuation, we instead consider a logarithmic transformation of that objective. More specifically, define \( u_i(\cdot) = b_i \log v_i(\cdot) \) to be bidder \( i \)'s surrogate valuation. Since the logarithmic transformation is an increasing function of \( v_i \), for every bidder, her objective amounts to maximizing the value of this surrogate valuation. Substituting in Equation (14) using the surrogate valuation for each player gives

\[
u_i(x) = u_i(x^*) - \left( \sum_{j' \neq i} u_{ij'}(x^*_{-i}) - \sum_{j' \neq i} u_{ij'}(x^*) \right).
\]  

21
This shows that the surrogate valuation of a bidder for the output of the PA mechanism equals her surrogate valuation for the PF allocation minus a “payment” which corresponds to exactly the externalities that the bidder causes with respect to the surrogate valuations! Note that, in settings where monetary payments are allowed, a VCG mechanism first computes an allocation that maximizes the social welfare, and then defines a set of monetary payments such that each bidder’s payment corresponds to the externality that her presence causes. The connection between the PA mechanism and VCG mechanisms is complete if one notices that the PF objective aims to compute an allocation $x$ maximizing the value of $\sum_i b_i \log v_i(x)$, which is exactly the social welfare $\sum_i u_i(x)$ with respect to the players’ surrogate valuations. Therefore, the impact that the fraction being removed from each player’s PF allocation has on that player’s valuation is analogous to that of a VCG payment in the space of surrogate valuations. The fact that the PA mechanism is truthful can hence be deduced from the fact the players wish to maximize their surrogate valuations and the VCG mechanism is truthful with respect to these valuations. Nevertheless, the fact that the PA mechanism guarantees such a strong approximation of the PF solution remains surprising even after revealing this reduction.

Also note that VCG mechanisms do not, in general, guarantee envy-freeness. The connection between the PA mechanism and VCG mechanisms that we provide above, combined with the envy-freeness results that we proved for the PA mechanism for both additive linear and Leontief valuations, implies that the VCG mechanism is actually envy-free for settings with money and bidders having the corresponding surrogate valuations. Therefore, these results also contribute to the recent work on finding truthful, envy-free, and efficient mechanisms [35, 36].

**Strong Demand Matching Mechanism**

We now provide an even less obvious connection between the SDM mechanism and existing literature on mechanism design with money; this time we illustrate how one can interpret the SDM mechanism as a stable matching mechanism. In order to facilitate this connection, we begin by reducing the problem of computing a valid assignment to the problem of computing a “stable” matching: we first scale each bidder’s valuations so that her minimum non-zero valuation for an item is equal to $n$, and then, for each item $j$ we create $n$ copies of that item such that the $k$-th copy (where $k \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$) of item $j$ has a reserve price $r_{jk} = k$. Given some price for each item copy, every buyer is seeking to be matched to one copy with a price that maximizes her valuation to price ratio, i.e. an MBB copy. A matching of each bidder to a distinct item copy in this new problem instance is stable if and only if every bidder is matched to an MBB copy; it is easy to verify that such a stable matching will always exist since there are $n$ copies of each item. Note that in a stable matching any two copies of the same item, each of which is being matched to some bidder, need to have exactly the same price, otherwise the more expensive copy cannot be an MBB choice for the bidder matched to it.

Now, a valid assignment of the initial input of the SDM mechanism implies a stable matching in the new problem instance: set the price $p_{jk}$ of the $k$-th copy of item $j$ to be equal to the price $p_j$ of item $j$ in the valid assignment, unless this violates its reserve price, i.e. $p_{jk} = \max\{p_j, r_{jk}\}$, and match each bidder to a distinct copy of the item that she was assigned to by the valid assignment; the validity of the assignment implies that, for each item $j$, the number of bidders assigned to it is at most $\lfloor p_j \rfloor$, and hence the number of item copies for which $p_{jk} \geq r_{jk}$, i.e. $p_{jk} = p_j$ is enough to support all these bidders. Similarly, a stable matching of the item copies implies a valid assignment of the actual items of the initial problem instance: the price $p_j$ of each item $j$ is set to be equal to the minimum price over all its copies ($p_j = \min_k \{p_{jk}\}$), and each bidder who is matched to one of
these copies is allocated a fraction $1/p_j$ of the corresponding actual item.

Using this reduction, we can now focus on the problem of computing such a stable matching of each bidder to just one distinct copy of some item; that is, we wish to define a price $p_{jk} \geq r_{jk}$ for each one of the $m \cdot n$ item copies, as well as a matching of each bidder to a distinct copy such that every bidder is matched to one of her MBB copies for the given prices. If we consider the same surrogate valuations $u_i(\cdot) = \log v_i(\cdot)$, the objective of each bidder $i$ to be matched to a copy of some item $j$ that maximizes the ratio $v_{ij}/p_{jk}$ is translated to the objective of maximizing the difference $\log v_{ij} - \log p_{jk}$. If one therefore replaces the values $v_{ij}$ of the valuation vector reported by each bidder $i$ with the values $\log v_{ij}$, then the initial problem is reduced to the problem of computing stable prices for these transformed valuations, assuming that monetary payments are allowed. This problem has received a lot of attention in the matching literature, building upon the assignment model of Shapley and Shubik [42]. Having revealed this connection, we know that we can truthfully compute a bidder optimal matching that does not violate the reserve prices using, for example, the mechanism of Aggarwal et al. [43]; one can verify that these are exactly the logarithmic transformations of the prices of the SDM mechanism, and also that this is the matching the SDM mechanism computes. Note that increasing the surrogate prices of overdemanded item copies by some additive constant corresponds to increasing the corresponding actual prices by a multiplicative constant. Therefore, this transformation also sheds some light on why the SDM mechanism uses multiplicative increases of the item prices.

6 Conclusion

Our work was motivated by the fact that no incentive compatible mechanisms were known for the natural and widely used fairness concept of proportional fairness. In hindsight our work provides several new contributions. Firstly, the class of bidder valuation functions for which our results apply is surprisingly large and it contains several well studied functions; previous truthful mechanisms for fairness were studied for much more restricted classes of valuation functions. Secondly, to the best of our knowledge, this is first work that defines and gives guarantees for a strong notion of approximation for fairness, where one desires to approximate the valuation of every bidder. Lastly, our Partial Allocation mechanism can be seen as a framework for designing truthful mechanisms without money. This mechanism can be generalized further by restricting the range of the outcomes (similar to maximal-in-range mechanisms when one can use money). We believe that this generalization is a powerful one, and might allow for new solutions to other mechanism design problems without money. We plan to explore this in our future research.

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APPENDIX

This Appendix includes the proofs that are missing from the main section.

Proof of Lemma 3.3. We first prove that this lemma is true for any number $k$ of pairs when $\beta_i = 1$ for every pair. For this special case we need to show that, if $\sum_{i=1}^{k} \delta_i \leq b$, then

$$\prod_{i=1}^{k} (1 + \delta_i) \leq \left(1 + \frac{b}{k}\right)^k.$$ 

Let $\tilde{\delta}_i$ denote the values that actually maximize the left hand side of this inequality and $\Delta_{k'} = \sum_{i=1}^{k'} \tilde{\delta}_i$ denote the sum of these values up to $\tilde{\delta}_{k'}$. Note that it suffices to show that $\tilde{\delta}_i = b/k$ for all $i$ since we have

$$\prod_{i=1}^{k} (1 + \delta_i) \leq \prod_{i=1}^{k} (1 + \tilde{\delta}_i),$$

and replacing $\tilde{\delta}_i$ with $b/k$ yields the inequality that we want to prove.

To prove that $\tilde{\delta}_i = b/k$ we first prove that for any $k' \leq k$ and any $i \leq k'$ we get $\tilde{\delta}_i = \Delta_{k'}/k'$; we prove this fact by induction on $k'$: For the basis step ($k' = 2$) we show that $\tilde{\delta}_1 = \Delta_2/2$. For any given value of $\Delta_2$ we know that any choice of $\delta_1$ will yield

$$\prod_{i=1}^{2} (1 + \delta_i) = (1 + \delta_1)(1 + \Delta_2 - \delta_1).$$

Taking the partial derivative with respect to $\delta_1$ readily shows that this is maximized when $\delta_1 = \Delta_2/2$, thus $\tilde{\delta}_1 = \Delta_2/2$. For the inductive step we assume that $\tilde{\delta}_i = \Delta_{k'-1}/(k' - 1)$ for all $i \leq k' - 1$. This implies that for any given value of $\Delta_{k'}$, given a choice of $\delta_{k'}$ the remaining product is maximized if the following holds

$$\prod_{i=1}^{k'} (1 + \delta_i) = \left(1 + \frac{\Delta_{k'} - \delta_{k'}}{k' - 1}\right)^{k'-1} (1 + \delta_{k'}).$$

Once again, taking the partial derivative of this last formula with respect to $\delta_{k'}$ for any given $\Delta_{k'}$ shows that this is maximized when $\delta_{k'} = \Delta_{k'}/k'$. This of course implies that $\Delta_{k' - 1} = \frac{k'-1}{k'} \Delta_{k'}$ so $\tilde{\delta}_i = \Delta_{k'}/k'$ for all $i \leq k'$.

This property of the $\tilde{\delta}_i$ that we just proved, along with the fact that $\Delta_k \leq b$ implies

$$\prod_{i=1}^{k} (1 + \delta_i) \leq \left(1 + \frac{\Delta_k}{k}\right)^k \leq \left(1 + \frac{b}{k}\right)^k.$$ 

We now use what we proved above in order to prove the lemma for any rational $\delta_i$ using a proof by contradiction. Assume that there exists a multiset $A$ of pairs $(\delta_i, \beta_i)$ with $\beta_i \geq 1$ and $\sum_i \beta_i \cdot \delta_i \leq b$ such that

$$\prod_{i=1}^{B} (1 + \delta_i)^{\beta_i} > \left(1 + \frac{b}{B}\right)^B,$$  

(15)
where $B = \sum_i \beta_i$. Let $M$ be an arbitrarily large value such that $\beta'_i = M\beta_i$ is a natural number for all $i$. Also, let $b' = Mb$. Then $\sum_i \beta'_i \cdot \delta_i \leq b'$, and $B' = M \cdot B = \sum_i \beta'_i$. Raising both sides of Inequality 15 to the power of $M$ yields

$$\prod_i (1 + \delta_i)^{\beta'_i} > \left(1 + \frac{b'}{B'}\right)^{B'}.$$ 

To verify that this is a contradiction, we create a multiset to which, for any pair $(\delta_i, \beta_i)$ of multiset $A$, we add $\beta'_i$ pairs $(\delta_i, 1)$. This multiset contradicts what we showed above for the special case of pairs with $\beta_i = 1$.

Extending the result to real valued $\delta_i$ just requires approximating the $\delta_i$ closely enough with rational valued terms. Specifically, let $\delta_i = \delta'_i + \epsilon_i$, where $\epsilon_i \geq 0$ and $\delta'_i$ is rational. Then $\sum_i \delta'_i \beta_i \leq b$, and by the result for rational $\delta$,

$$\prod_i (1 + \delta'_i)^{\beta_i} \leq \left(1 + \frac{b}{B}\right)^B.$$ 

But then

$$\prod_i (1 + \delta_i)^{\beta_i} \leq \prod_i (1 + \delta'_i + \epsilon_i)^{\beta_i}$$

$$\leq \prod_i \left[(1 + \delta'_i) \left(1 + \frac{\epsilon_i}{1 + \delta'_i}\right)\right]^{\beta_i}$$

$$\leq \left(1 + \frac{b}{B}\right)^B \prod_i \left(1 + \frac{\epsilon_i}{1 + \delta'_i}\right)^{\beta_i}.$$ 

Since $\epsilon_i$ can be arbitrarily small, it follows that even for real valued $\delta_i$

$$\prod_i (1 + \delta_i)^{\beta_i} \leq \left(1 + \frac{b}{B}\right)^B.$$ 

**Proof of Lemma 3.10.** For any given approximate PF allocation $\tilde{x}$, one can quickly verify that the valuation of bidder $i$ for her final allocation only decreases as the value of $\prod_{i' \neq i} [v_{i'}(\tilde{x} - i)]^{b_i}$ increases. We can therefore assume that the approximation factor is minimized when the denominator of Equation (12) takes on its maximum value, i.e. $\tilde{x}_{-i} = x^*_{-i}$. This implies that the fraction in this equation will always be less than or equal to 1, and the valuation of bidder $i$ will therefore equal

$$\tilde{f}_i \cdot v_i(\tilde{x}) \geq \left(\frac{\prod_{i' \neq i} [v_{i'}(\tilde{x})]^{b_i}}{\prod_{i' \neq i} [v_{i'}(x^*)]^{b_i}}\right)^{1/b_i}$$

$$\geq (1 - \epsilon) \left(\frac{\prod_{i' \neq i} [v_{i'}(x^*)]^{b_i}}{\prod_{i' \neq i} [v_{i'}(x^*_{-i})]^{b_i}}\right)^{1/b_i}$$

$$= (1 - \epsilon) f_i \cdot v_i(x^*).$$

The first inequality holds because the right hand side is minimized when $\tilde{x}_{-i} = x^*_{-i}$, and the second inequality holds because $\tilde{x}$ is defined to be an allocation that approximates $x^*$. The result follows on using Theorem 3.4 to lower bound $f_i$. 

$\square$
Proof of Lemma 3.11. In the proof of the previous lemma we showed that, if bidder $i$ is truthful, then her valuation in the final allocation produced by the adapted PA mechanism will always be at least $(1 - \epsilon)$ times the valuation $f_i \cdot v_i(x^*)$ that she would receive if all the PF allocations could be computed optimally rather than approximately. We now show that her valuation cannot be more than $(1 - \epsilon)^{-1}$ times greater than $f_i \cdot v_i(x^*)$, even if she misreports her preferences. Upon proving this statement, the theorem follows from the fact that, even if bidder $i$ being truthful results in the worst possible approximation for this bidder, still any lie can increase her valuation by a factor of at most $(1 - \epsilon)^{-2}$.

For any allocation $\bar{x}$ we know that $\prod_{i' \neq i} [v_i'(\bar{x})]^{b_{i'}} \leq \prod_{i' \neq i} [v_i'(x^*)]^{b_{i'}}$, by definition of PF. Also, any allocation $\bar{x}_{-i}$ that the approximation algorithm may compute instead of $x^*_{-i}$ will satisfy $\prod_{i' \neq i} [v_i'(\bar{x})]^{b_{i'}} \geq (1 - \epsilon) \prod_{i' \neq i} [v_i'(x^*)]^{b_{i'}}$. Using Equation (12) we can thus infer that no matter what the computed allocations $\bar{x}$ and $\bar{x}_{-i}$ are, bidder $i$ will experience a valuation of at most

$$\left( \frac{\prod_{i' \neq i} [v_i'(\bar{x})]^{b_{i'}}}{\prod_{i' \neq i} [v_i'(\bar{x}_{-i})]^{b_{i'}}} \right)^{1/b_i} \leq \left( \frac{\prod_{i' \neq i} [v_i'(x^*)]^{b_{i'}}}{\prod_{i' \neq i} [v_i'(\bar{x}_{-i})]^{b_{i'}}} \right)^{1/b_i} \leq (1 - \epsilon) \left( \frac{\prod_{i' \neq i} [v_i'(x^*)]^{b_{i'}}}{\prod_{i' \neq i} [v_i'(x^*_{-i})]^{b_{i'}}} \right)^{1/b_i} \leq (1 - \epsilon) f_i \cdot v_i(x^*).$$

\[\square\]

Proof of Lemma 3.12. As the valuation functions are all concave and homogeneous of degree one, so is the following product,

$$\left( \prod_{i} [v_i(x)]^{b_i} \right)^{1/B}.$$

Also, note that this product has the same optima as the PF objective. Consequently the above optimization is an instance of convex programming with linear constraints, which can be solved approximately in polynomial time. More precisely, an approximation with an additive error of $\epsilon$ to the optimal product of the valuations can be found in time polynomial in the problem instance size and $\log(1/\epsilon)$ [44]. In addition, the approximation is a feasible allocation.

We normalize the individual valuations to have a value 1 for an allocation of everything. If $B = \sum_i b_i$ is the sum of the bidders’ weights then, at the optimum, bidder $i$ has valuation at least $b_i/B$. To verify that this is true, just note that the sum of the prices of all goods in the competitive equilibrium will be $B$ and bidder $i$ will have a budget of $b_i$. Since each bidder will spend all her budget on the items she values the most for the prices at hand, her valuation for her bundle will have to be at least $b_i/B$. This implies that the optimum product valuation is at least $\prod_i (b_i/B)^{b_i/B} \geq \min_i b_i/B$; this can be approximated to within an additive factor $\epsilon \cdot \min_i b_i/B$ in time polynomial in $\log 1/\epsilon + \log B$, and this is an approximation to within a multiplicative factor of $1 - \epsilon$.  

\[\square\]
References


