Papers Under Submission and Working Papers

• Optimal Metric Distortion for Matching on the Line (under submission)
  with A. Filos-Ratsikas, M. Latifian, E. Rewinski, and A.A. Voudouris
  
• Simultaneously Satisfying MXS and EFL (under submission)
  with A. Ashuri
  
• Learning-Augmented Robust Algorithmic Recourse (under submission)
  with K. Kayastha and S. Jabbari
  
• Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms without Money
  with D. Schoepflin, C. Tzamos, and M. Zampetakis
  
• Mechanism Design for Fair Division (journal version)
  with R. Cole and G. Goel

Journal Publications

• Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions
  with E. Balkanski, P. Garimidi, D. Schoepflin, and X. Tan
  Operations Research (forthcoming)
• Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions
  with M. Feldman, N. Gravin, and D. Schoepflin
  Operations Research (forthcoming)
• Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location
  with P. Agrawal, E. Balkanski, T. Ou, and X. Tan
  Mathematics of Operations Research
• Mechanism Design with Predictions: An Annotated Reading List
  with E. Balkanski and X. Tan
  ACM SIGecom Exchanges
• Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games
  with G. Christodoulou and A. Sgouritsa
  Operations Research
• Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents
  with S. Branzei and R. Mehta
  Operations Research
• Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items
  with R. Cole
  SIAM Journal of Computing
• The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions
  with P. Duetting and T. Roughgarden
  Mathematics of Operations Research
• Optimal Cost-Sharing in General Resource Selection Games
  with K. Kollias and T. Roughgarden
  Operations Research
• Pricing Private Data
  with C. Aperjis and B. Huberman
  Electronic Markets
• Decentralized Utilitarian Mechanisms for Scheduling Games
  with R. Cole, J.R. Correa, V. Mirrokni and N. Olver
  Games and Economic Behavior
• The Impact of Social Ignorance on Weighted Congestion Games
  with D. Fotakis, A. Kaporis, and P. Spirakis
  Theory of Computing Systems

Conference Publications

• Procurement Auctions with Best and Final Offers
  with R.P. McAfee and R. Paes Leme
  34th Web Conference (WWW 2025)
• EF2X Exists For Four Agents
  with A. Ashuri and A. Sgouritsa
  39th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2025)
• Clock Auctions Augmented with Unreliable Advice
  with D. Schoepflin and X. Tan
  36th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2025)
• Randomized Strategic Facility Location with Predictions
  with E. Balkanski and G. Shahkarami
  38th Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2024)
• Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via (p,q)-Veto Core
  with B. Berger, M. Feldman, and X. Tan
  25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2024)
• Online Mechanism Design with Predictions
  with E. Balkanski, X. Tan, and C. Zhu
  25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2024)
• Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division
  with A. Psomas, X. Tan, and P. Verma
  33rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2024)
• EFx Budget-Feasible Allocations with High Nash Welfare
  with M. Garbea and X. Tan
  26th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2023)
• Best of Both Distortion Worlds
  with M. Latifian and N. Shah
  24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2023)
• Proportionally Fair Online Allocation of Public Goods with Predictions
  with S. Banerjee, S. Hossain, B. Jin, E. Micha, and N. Shah
  32nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2023)
• Optimal Data Acquisition with Privacy-Aware Agents
  with R. Cummings, H. Elzayn, E. Pountourakis, and J. Ziani
  IEEE Conference on Secure and Trustworthy Machine Learning (SaTML 2023)
• Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions
  with E. Balkanski and X. Tan
  14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023)
• Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location
  with P. Agrawal, E. Balkanski, T. Ou, and X. Tan
  23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2022)
• Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions
  with M. Feldman, N. Gravin, and D. Schoepflin
  23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2022)
• Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions
  with K. Kollias, A. Sgouritsa, and X. Tan
  23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2022)
• Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods
  with I. Caragiannis, A. Psomas, and D. Schoepflin
  21st Int. Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2022)
• Optimal Deterministic Clock Auctions and Beyond
  with G. Christodoulou and D. Schoepflin
  13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022)
• Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions
  with E. Balkanski, P. Garimidi, D. Schoepflin, and X. Tan
  33rd ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2022)
• Online Nash Social Welfare Maximization with Predictions
  with S. Banerjee, A. Gorokh, and B. Jin
  33rd ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2022)
• Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values
  with R. Patel, E. Pountourakis, and D. Schoepflin
  14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2021)
• Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Mechanisms with Priors
  with E. Pountourakis and A. Sgouritsa
  22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2021)
• PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents
  with A. Baklanov, P. Garimidi, and D. Schoepflin
  30th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2021)
• Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations
  with A. Psomas and X. Tan
  35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2021)
• Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods
  with A. Baklanov, P. Garimidi, and D. Schoepflin
  35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2021)
• Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture
  with D. Halpern and N. Shah
  61st IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2020)
• Resource-Aware Protocols for Network Cost-Sharing Games
  with G. Christodoulou, A. Sgouritsa, and M. Latifian
  21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2020)
• A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching
  with R. Abebe, R. Cole, and J. Hartline
  31st ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2020)
• Balanced Ranking with Diversity Constraints
  with K. Yang and J. Stoyanovich
  28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2019)
• Fair and Efficient Memory Sharing: Confronting Free Riders
  with E.J. Friedman, C.A. Psomas, and S. Shenker
  33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2019)
• Coordination Mechanisms, Cost-Sharing, and Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling
  with I. Caragiannis and C. Vinci
  13th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2017)
• Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service
  with E. Markakis and T. Roughgarden
  18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2017)
• Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games under Uncertainty
  with G. Christodoulou and A. Sgouritsa
  18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2017)
• Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare
  with R. Cole, N.R. Devanur, K. Jain, T. Mai, V.V. Vazirani, and S. Yazdanbod
  18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2017)
• Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents
  with S. Branzei and R. Mehta
  18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2017)
• Participation Incentives on a Wireless Random Access Erasure Collision Channel
  with S. Weber
  12th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2017)
• Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items
  with R. Cole
  47th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 2015)
• Optimal Cost-Sharing in Weighted Congestion Games
  with K. Kollias and T. Roughgarden
  10th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2014)
• The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions
  with P. Duetting and T. Roughgarden
  15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2014)
• Mechanism Design for Fair Division
  with R. Cole and G. Goel
  14th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC 2013)
• Positive Results for Mechanism Design without Money
  with R. Cole and G. Goel
  12th Int. Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2013)
• Inner Product Spaces for MinSum Coordination Mechanisms
  with R. Cole, J.R. Correa, V. Mirrokni, and N. Olver
  43rd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 2011)
• The Impact of Social Ignorance on Weighted Congestion Games
  with D. Fotakis, A. Kaporis, and P. Spirakis
  5th Int. Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2009)